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Abstract
The open-source nature of the Android OS makes it possible
for manufacturers to ship custom versions of the OS along with
a set of pre-installed apps, often for product differentiation.
Some device vendors have recently come under scrutiny
for potentially invasive private data collection practices and
other potentially harmful or unwanted behavior of the pre-
installed apps on their devices. Yet, the landscape of pre-
installed software in Android has largely remained unexplored,
particularly in terms of the security and privacy implications of
such customizations. In this paper, we present the first large-
scale study of pre-installed software on Android devices from
more than 200 vendors. Our work relies on a large dataset
of real-world Android firmware acquired worldwide using
crowd-sourcing methods. This allows us to answer questions
related to the stakeholders involved in the supply chain, from
device manufacturers and mobile network operators to third-
party organizations like advertising and tracking services, and
social network platforms. Our study allows us to also uncover
relationships between these actors, which seem to revolve
primarily around advertising and data-driven services. Overall,
the supply chain around Android’s open source model lacks
transparency and has facilitated potentially harmful behaviors
and backdoored access to sensitive data and services with-
out user consent or awareness. We conclude the paper with
recommendations to improve transparency, attribution, and
accountability in the Android ecosystem.
I. INTRODUCTION
The openness of the Android source code makes it possible
for any manufacturer to ship a custom version of the OS along
with proprietary pre-installed apps on the system partition.
Most handset vendors take this opportunity to add value to
their products as a market differentiator, typically through
partnerships with Mobile Network Operators (MNOs), online
social networks, and content providers. Google does not forbid
this behavior, and it has developed its Android Compatibility
Program [8] to set the requirements that the modified OS must
fulfill in order to remain compatible with standard Android
apps, regardless of the modifications introduced. Devices made
by vendors that are part of the Android Certified Partners
program [5] come pre-loaded with Google’s suite of apps
(e.g., the Play Store and Youtube). Google does not provide
details about the certification processes. Companies that want
to include the Google Play service without the certification
can outsource the design of the product to a certified Original
Design Manufacturer (ODM) [7].
Certified or not, not all pre-installed software is deemed as
wanted by users, and the term “bloatware” is often applied
to such software. The process of how a particular set of apps
end up packaged together in the firmware of a device is not
transparent, and various isolated cases reported over the last
few years suggest that it lacks end-to-end control mechanisms
to guarantee that shipped firmware is free from vulnerabili-
ties [24], [25] or potentially malicious and unwanted apps. For
example, at Black Hat USA 2017, Johnson et al. [82], [47]
gave details of a powerful backdoor present in the firmware
of several models of Android smartphones, including the
popular BLU R1 HD. In response to this disclosure, Amazon
removed Blu products from their Prime Exclusive line-up [2].
A company named Shanghai Adups Technology Co. Ltd. was
pinpointed as responsible for this incident. The same report
also discussed the case of how vulnerable core system services
(e.g., the widely deployed MTKLogger component developed
by the chipset manufacturer MediaTek) could be abused by
co-located apps. The infamous Triada trojan has also been
recently found embedded in the firmware of several low-cost
Android smartphones [77], [66]. Other cases of malware found
pre-installed include Loki (spyware and adware) and Slocker
(ransomware), which were spotted in the firmware of various
high-end phones [6].
Android handsets also play a key role in the mass-scale
data collection practices followed by many actors in the dig-
ital economy, including advertising and tracking companies.
OnePlus has been under suspicion of collecting personally
identifiable information (PII) from users of its smartphones
through exceedingly detailed analytics [55], [54], and also de-
ploying the capability to remotely root the phone [53], [52]. In
July 2018 the New York Times revealed the existence of secret
agreements between Facebook and device manufacturers such
as Samsung [32] to collect private data from users without their
knowledge. This is currently under investigation by the US
Federal authorities [33]. Additionally, users from developing
countries with lax data protection and privacy laws may be at
an even greater risk. The Wall Street Journal has exposed the
presence of a pre-installed app that sends users’ geographical
location as well as device identifiers to GMobi, a mobile-
advertising agency that engages in ad-fraud activities [14],
[67]. Recently, the European Commission publicly expressed
concern about Chinese manufacturers like Huawei, alleging
that they were required to cooperate with national intelligence
services by installing backdoors on their devices [30].
Research Goals and Findings
To the best of our knowledge, no research study has so
far systematically studied the vast ecosystem of pre-installed
Android software and the privacy and security concerns asso-
ciated with them. This ecosystem has remained largely unex-
plored due to the inherent difficulty to access such software
at scale and across vendors. This state of affairs makes such
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2an study even more relevant, since i) these apps – typically
unavailable on app stores – have mostly escaped the scrutiny of
researchers and regulators; and ii) regular users are unaware
of their presence on the device, which could imply lack of
consent in data collection and other activities.
In this paper, we seek to shed light on the presence and
behavior of pre-installed software across Android devices. In
particular, we aim to answer the questions below:
• What is the ecosystem of pre-installed apps, including all
actors in the supply chain?
• What are the relationships between vendors and other stake-
holders (e.g., MNOs and third-party services)?
• Do pre-installed apps collect private and personally-
identifiable information (PII)? If so, with whom do they
share it?
• Are there any harmful or other potentially dangerous apps
among pre-installed software?
To address the points described above, we developed a
research agenda revolving around four main items:
1) We collected the firmware and traffic information from
real-world devices using crowd-sourcing methods (§II). We
obtained the firmware from 2,748 users spanning 1,742
device models from 214 vendors. Our user base covers
130 countries from the main Android markets. Our dataset
contains 424,584 unique firmware files, but only 9% of the
collected APKs were found in Google Play. We comple-
ment this dataset with traffic flows associated with 139,665
unique apps, including pre-installed ones, provided by over
20.4K users of the Lumen app [86] from 144 countries. To
the best of our knowledge, this is the largest dataset of
real-world Android firmware analyzed so far.
2) We performed an investigation of the ecosystem of pre-
installed Android apps and the actors involved (§III) by
analyzing the Android manifest files of the app packages,
their certificates, and the Third-Party Libraries (TPLs) they
use. Our analysis covers 1,200 unique developers associ-
ated with major manufacturers, vendors, MNOs, and Inter-
net service companies. We also uncover a vast landscape of
third-party libraries (11,665 unique TPLs), many of which
mainly provide data-driven services such as advertisement,
analytics, and social networking.
3) We extracted and analyzed an extensive set of custom
permissions (4,845) declared by hardware vendors, MNOs,
third-party services, security firms, industry alliances,
chipset manufacturers, and Internet browsers. Such permis-
sions may potentially expose data and features to over-the-
top apps and could be used to access privileged system
resources and sensitive data in a way that circumvents the
Android permission model. A manual inspection reveals a
complex supply chain that involves different stakeholders
and potential commercial partnerships between them (§IV).
4) We carried out a behavioral analysis of nearly 50% of the
apps in our dataset using both static and dynamic analysis
tools (§V). Our results reveal that a significant part of
the pre-installed software exhibit potentially harmful or
unwanted behavior. While it is known that personal data
collection and user tracking is pervasive in the Android
app ecosystem as a whole [78], [84], [85], we find that
it is also quite prevalent in pre-installed apps. We have
identified instances of user tracking activities by pre-
installed Android software – and embedded third-party
libraries – which range from collecting the usual set of PII
and geolocation data to more invasive practices that include
personal email and phone call metadata, contacts, and a
variety of behavioral and usage statistics in some cases.
We also found a few isolated malware samples belonging to
known families, according to VirusTotal, with prevalence in
the last few years (e.g., Xynyin, SnowFox, Rootnik, Triada
and Ztorg), and generic trojans displaying a standard set
of malicious behaviors (e.g., silent app promotion, SMS
fraud, ad fraud, and URL click fraud).
All in all, our work reveals complex relationships between
actors in the Android ecosystem, in which user data seems
to be a major commodity. We uncover a myriad of actors
involved in the development of mobile software, as well as
poor software engineering practices and lack of transparency in
the supply chain that unnecessarily increase users’ security and
privacy risks. We conclude this paper with various recommen-
dations to palliate this state of affairs, including transparency
models to improve attribution and accountability, and clearer
mechanisms to obtain informed consent. Given the scale of
the ecosystem and the need to perform manual inspections,
we will gradually make our dataset available to the research
community and regulators to boost investigations.
II. DATA COLLECTION
Obtaining pre-installed apps and other software artifacts
(e.g., certificates installed in the system root store) at scale is
challenging. As purchasing all the mobile handset models (and
their many variations) available in the market is unfeasible,
we decided to crowdsource the collection of pre-installed
software using a purpose-built app: Firmware Scanner [34].
Using Firmware Scanner, we obtained pre-installed software
from 1,742 device models. We also decided to use Lumen,
an app that aims to promote mobile transparency and enable
user control over their mobile traffic [86], [49] to obtain
anonymized network flow metadata from Lumen’s real users.
This allows us to correlate the information we extract from
static analysis, for a subset of mobile apps, with realistic
network traffic generated by mobile users in the wild and
captured in user-space. In the remainder of this section, we
explain the methods implemented by each app and present
our datasets. We discuss the ethical implications of our data
collection in Section II-C.
A. Firmware Scanner
Publicly available on Google Play [34], Firmware Scanner
is a purpose-built Android app that looks for and extracts
pre-installed apps and DEX files in the app and priv-app
folders located in /system/, libraries in the lib and lib64
folders in /system/, any files in the /system/vendor/
folder if that directory exists, and root certificates located
in /system/etc/security/cacerts/. We can distin-
guish pre-installed apps from user-installed ones as the latter
are stored in /data/app/. In order to reduce the scanning
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Figure 1: Number of files per vendor. We do not display the vendors for which we have less than 3 devices.
and upload time, Firmware Scanner first computes the MD5
hashes of the relevant files (e.g., apps, libraries, and root
certificates) and then sends the list of these hashes to our
server. Only those missing in our dataset are uploaded over
a Wi-Fi connection to avoid affecting the user’s data plan.
Dataset: Thanks to 2,748 users who have organically installed
Firmware Scanner, we obtained firmware versions for 1,742
unique device models1 branded by 214 vendors2 as summa-
rized in Table I. Our dataset contains 424,584 unique files
(based on their MD5 hash) as shown in Figure 1 for selected
vendors. For each device we plot three dots, one for each type
of file, while the shape indicates the major Android version
that the device is running.3 The number of pre-installed files
varies greatly from one vendor to another. Although it is not
surprising to see a large amount of native libraries due to
hardware differences, some vendors embed hundreds of extra
apps (i.e., “.apk” files) compared to other manufacturers
running the same Android version. For the rest of our study, we
focus on 82,501 Android apps present in the dataset, leaving
the analysis of root certificates and libraries for future work.
Our user-base is geographically distributed across 130 coun-
tries, yet 35% of our users are located in Europe, 29% in
America (North and South), and 24% in Asia. Further, up to
25% and 20% of the total number of devices in our dataset
belong to Samsung and Huawei ones, respectively. This is co-
herent with market statistics available online [35], [10]. While
both manufacturers are Google-certified vendors, our dataset
also contains low-end Android devices from manufacturers
targeting markets such as Thailand, Indonesia, and India –
many of these vendors are not Google-certified. Finally, to
1We use the MD5 hash of the IMEI to uniquely identify a user, and the
build fingerprint reported by the vendor to uniquely identify a given device
model. Note that two devices with the same fingerprint may be customized
and therefore, have different apps pre-installed.
2We rely on the vendor string self-reported by the OS vendor, which could
be bogus. For instance, Alps rebrands as “iPhone” some of its models, which,
according to information available online, are Android-based replicas of iOS.
3We found that 5,244 of the apps do not have any activity, service, or
receiver. These apps may potentially be used as providers of resources (e.g.,
images, fonts) for other apps.
4We consider that a given device is rooted according to three signals. First,
when Firmware Scanner has finished the upload of pre-installed binaries,
the app asks the user whether the handset is rooted according to their own
understanding (note that the user may choose not to answer the question). As
a complement, we use the library RootBeer [63] to progammatically check if
a device is rooted or not. If any of these sources indicates that the device is
potentially rooted, we consider it as such. Finally, we discard devices where
there is evidence of custom ROMs having been installed (e.g., LineageOS).
We discuss the limitations of this method in Section VI.
avoid introducing any bias in our results, we exclude 321
potentially rooted handsets from our study.4
B. Lumen
Lumen is an Android app available on Google Play that
aims to promote mobile transparency and enable user control
over their personal data and traffic. It leverages the Android
VPN permission to intercept and analyze all Android traffic in
user-space and in-situ, even if encrypted, without needing root
permissions. By running locally on the user’s device, Lumen
is able to correlate traffic flows with system-level information
and app activity. Lumen’s architecture is publicly available and
described in [86]. Lumen allows us to accurately determine
which app is responsible for an observed PII leak from the
vantage point of the user and as triggered by real user and
device stimuli in the wild. Since all the analysis occurs on the
device, only processed traffic metadata is exfiltrated from the
device.
Dataset: For this study, we use anonymized traffic logs
provided by over 20.4K users from 144 countries (according
to Google Play Store statistics) coming from Android phones
manufactured by 291 vendors. This includes 34,553,193 traffic
flows from 139,665 unique apps (298,412 unique package
name and version combinations). However, as Lumen does not
collect app fingerprints or hashes of files, to find the overlap
between the Lumen dataset and the pre-installed apps, we
match records sharing the same package name, app version,
and device vendor as the ones in the pre-installed apps dataset.
While this method does not guarantee that the overlapping
apps are exactly the same, it is safe to assume that phones
that are not rooted are not shipped with different apps under
the same package names and app versions. As a result, we have
1,055 unique pre-installed app/version/vendor combinations
present in both datasets.
C. Ethical Concerns
Our study involves the collection of data from real users
who organically installed Firmware Scanner or Lumen on
their devices. Therefore, we follow the principles of informed
consent [76] and we avoid the collection of any personal or
sensitive data. We sought the approval of our institutional
Ethics Board and Data Protection Officer (DPO) before start-
ing the data collection. Both tools also provide extensive
privacy policies in their Google Play profile. Below we discuss
details specific to each tool.
Firmware Scanner: The app collects some metadata about
the device to attribute observations to manufacturers (e.g., its
4Vendor Country Certifiedpartner
Device
Fingerprints Users
Files
(med.)
Apps
(med.)
Libs
(med.)
DEX
(med.)
Root certs
(med.)
Files
(total)
Apps
(total)
Samsung South Korea Yes 441 924 868 136 556 83 150 260,187 29,466
Huawei China Yes 343 716 1,084 68 766 96 146 150,405 12,401
LGE South Korea Yes 74 154 675 84 385 89 150 58,273 3,596
Alps Mobile China No 65 136 632 56 385 46 148 29,288 2,883
Motorola US/China Yes 50 110 801 127 454 62 151 28,291 2,158
Total (214 vendors) — 22% 1,742 2,748 424,584 82,501
Table I: General statistics for the top-5 vendors in our dataset.
model and fingerprint) along with some data about the pre-
installed applications (extracted from the Package Manager),
network operator (MNO), and user (the timezone, and the
MCC and MNC codes from their SIM card, if available).
We compute the MD5 hash of the device’s IMEI to identify
duplicates and updated firmware versions for a given device.
Lumen: Users are required to opt in twice before initiating
traffic interception [76]. Lumen preserves its users’ privacy
by performing flow processing and analysis on the device,
only sending anonymized flow metadata for research purposes.
Lumen does not send back any unique identifiers, device
fingerprints, or raw traffic captures. To further protect user’s
privacy, Lumen also ignores all flows generated by browser
apps which may potentially deanonymize a user; and allows
the user to disable traffic interception at any time.
III. ECOSYSTEM OVERVIEW
The openness of Android OS has enabled a complex sup-
ply chain ecosystem formed by different stakeholders, be it
manufacturers, MNOs, affiliated developers, and distributors.
These actors can add proprietary apps and features to Android
devices, seeking to provide a better user experience, add value
to their products, or provide access to proprietary services.
However, this could also be for (mutual) financial gain [32],
[14]. This section provides an overview of pre-installed An-
droid packages to uncover some of the gray areas that surround
them, the large and diverse set of developers involved, the
presence of third-party advertising and tracking libraries, and
the role of each stakeholder.
A. Developer Ecosystem
We start our study by analyzing the organizations signing
each pre-installed app. First, we cluster apps by the unique
certificates used to sign them and then we rely on the informa-
tion present in the Issuer field of the certificate to identify
the organization [15]. Despite the fact that this is the most
reliable signal to identify the organization signing the software,
it is still noisy as a company can use multiple certificates, one
for each organizational unit. More importantly, these are self-
signed certificates, which significantly lowers the trust that can
be put on them.
We were unable to identify the company behind several
certificates (denoted as Unknown company in Table II) due
to insufficient or dubious information in the certificate: e.g.,
the Issuer field only contains the mentions Company and
department. We have come across apps that are signed
by 42 different ”Android Debug” certificates on phones from
21 different brands. This reflects poor and potentially insecure
development practices as Android’s debug certificate is used to
automatically sign apps in development environments, hence
enabling other apps signed with that certificate to access its
functionality without requesting any permission. Most app
stores (including Google Play) will not accept the publication
of an app signed with a Debug certificate [9]. Furthermore,
we also found as many as 115 certificates that only mention
“Android” in the Issuer field. A large part (43%) of those
certificates are supposedly issued in the US, while others
seem to have been issued in Taiwan (16%), China (13%),
and Switzerland (13%). In the absence of a public list of
official developer certificates, it is not possible to verify their
authenticity or know their owner, as discussed in Section VI.
With this in mind, we extracted 1,200 unique certificates out
of our dataset. Table II shows the 5 most present companies
in the case of phone vendors (left) and other development
companies (right). This analysis uncovered a vast landscape
of third-party software in the long-tail, including large digital
companies (e.g., LinkedIn, Spotify, and TripAdvisor), as well
as advertising and tracking services. This is the case of iron-
Source, an advertising firm signing pre-installed software [43]
found in Asus, Wiko and other vendors, and TrueCaller, a
service to block unwanted call or texts [57]. According to
their website and also independent sources [40], [71], True-
Caller uses crowdsourced mechanisms to build a large dataset
of phone numbers used for spam and also for advertising.
Likewise, we have found 123 apps (by their MD5) signed
by Facebook. These apps are found in 939 devices, 68% of
which are Samsung’s. We have also found apps signed by
AccuWeather, a weather service previously found collecting
personal data aggressively [87], Adups software, responsible
for the Adups backdoor [46], and GMobi [36], a mobile-
advertising company previously accused of dubious practices
by the Wall Street Journal [14].
B. Third-party Services
As in the web, mobile app developers can embed in their
pre-installed software third-party libraries (TPLs) provided
by other companies, including libraries (SDKs) provided by
ad networks, analytics services or social networks. In this
section we use LibRadar++, an obfuscation-resilient tool to
identify TPLs used in Android apps [91], on our dataset to
examine their presence due to the potential privacy implica-
tions for users: when present in pre-installed apps, TPLs have
the capacity to monitor user’s activities longitudinally [90],
[85]. We exclude well-known TPLs providing development
support such as the Android support library. First, we classify
the 11,665 unique TPLs identified by LibRadar++ according
to the categories reported by Li et al. [83], AppBrain [51],
5Company name Number ofcertificates Country
Certified
partner?
Google 92 United States N/A
Motorola 65 US/China Yes
Asus 60 Taiwan Yes
Samsung 38 South Korea Yes
Huawei 29 China Yes
Total (vendors) 740 — —
Company name Number ofcertificates Country
Number of
vendors
MediaTek 19 China 17
Aeon 12 China 3
Tinno Mobile 11 China 6
Verizon Wireless 10 United States 5
Unknown company 7 China 1
Total 460 — 214
Table II: Left: top-5 most frequent developers (as per the total number of apps signed by them), and right: for other companies.
Category # libraries # apps # vendors Example
Advertisement 164 (107) 11,935 164 Braze
Mobile analytics 100 (54) 6,935 158 Apptentive
Social networks 70 (20) 6,652 157 Twitter
All categories 334 25,333 165 —
Table III: Selected TPL categories present in pre-installed
apps. In brackets, we report the number of TPLs when grouped
by package name.
and PrivacyGrade [58]. We manually classified those TPLs
that were not categorized by these datasets.
We focus on categories that could cause harm to the users’
privacy, such as mobile analytics and targeted advertisement
libraries. We find 334 TPLs in such categories, as summarized
in Table III. We could identify advertising and tracking com-
panies such as Smaato (specialized in geo-targeted ads [64]),
GMobi, Appnext, ironSource, Crashlytics, and Flurry. Some
of these third-party providers were also found shipping their
own packages in Section III-A or are prominent actors across
apps published in Google Play Store [85]. We found 806 apps
embedding Facebook’s Graph SDK which is distributed over
748 devices. The certificates of these apps suggests that 293
of them were signed by the device vendor, and 30 by an
operator (only 98 are signed by Facebook itself). The presence
of Facebook’s SDKs in pre-installed apps could, in some cases,
be explained by partnerships established by Facebook with
Android vendors as the New York Times revealed [32].
We found other companies that provide mobile analytics and
app monetization schemes such as Umeng, Fyber (previously
Heyzap), and Kochava [85]. Moreover, we also found instances
of advanced analytics companies in Asus handsets such as
Appsee [17] and Estimote [28]. According to their website,
Appsee is a TPL that allows developers to record and upload
the users’ screen [16], including touch events [84]. If, by itself,
recording the user’s screen does not constitute a privacy leak,
recording and uploading this data could unintentionally leak
private information such as account details. Estimote develops
solutions for indoors geo-localization [28]. Estimote’s SDK
allows an app to react to nearby wireless beacons to, for
example, send personalized push notifications to the user upon
entering a shop
Finally, we find TPLs provided by companies specialized in
the Chinese market [91] in 548 pre-installed apps. The most
relevant ones are Tencent’s SDK, AliPay (a payment service)
and Baidu SDK [20] (for advertising and geolocation / geo-
coding services), the last two possibly used as replacements
for Google Pay and Maps in the Chinese market, respectively.
Only one of the apps embedding these SDKs is signed by
the actual third-party service provider, which indicates that
their presence in pre-installed apps is likely due to the app
developers’ design decisions.
C. Public and Non-public Apps
We crawled the Google Play Store to identify how many
of the pre-installed apps found by Firmware Scanner are
available to the public. This analysis took place on the 19th
of November, 2018 and we only used the package name of
the pre-installed apps as a parameter. We found that only
9% of the package names in our dataset are indexed in the
Google Play Store. For those indexed, few categories dominate
the spectrum of pre-installed apps according to Google Play
metadata, notably communication, entertainment, productivity,
tools, and multimedia apps.
The low presence of pre-installed apps in the store suggests
that this type of software might have escaped any scrutiny
by the research community. In fact, we have found sam-
ples of pre-installed apps developed by prominent organi-
zations that are not publicly available on Google Play. For
instance, software developed and signed by Facebook (e.g.,
com.facebook.appmanager), Amazon, and CleanMas-
ter among others. Likewise, we found non-publicly available
versions of popular web browsers (e.g., UME Browser, Opera).
Looking at the last update information reported by An-
droid’s package manager for these apps, we found that pre-
installed apps also present on Google Play are updated more
often than the rest of pre-installed apps: 74% of the non-public
apps do not seem to get updated and 41% of them remained
unpatched for 5 years or more. If a vulnerability exists in one
of these applications (see Section V), the user may stay at risk
for as long as they keep using the device.
IV. PERMISSION ANALYSIS
Android implements a permissions model to control apps’
access to sensitive data and system resources [56]. By default,
apps are not allowed to perform any protected operation.
Android permissions are not limited to those defined by AOSP:
any app developer – including manufacturers – can define their
own custom permissions to expose their functionality to other
apps [26]. We leverage Androguard [4] to extract and study
the permissions, both declared and requested, by pre-installed
apps. We primarily focus on custom permissions as i) pre-
installed services have privileged access to system resources,
and ii) privileged pre-installed services may (involuntarily)
expose critical services and data, even bypassing Android’s
official permission set.
6A. Declared Custom Permissions
We identify 1,795 unique Android package names across
108 Android vendors defining 4,845 custom permissions.
We exclude AOSP–defined permissions and those associated
with Google’s Cloud Messaging (GCM) [37]. The number of
custom permissions declared per Android vendor varies across
brands and models due to the actions of other stakeholders in
the supply chain. We classify the organizations declaring cus-
tom permissions in 8 groups as shown in Table IV: hardware
vendors, MNOs (e.g., Verizon), third-party services (e.g., Face-
book), AV firms (e.g., Avast), industry alliances (e.g., GSMA),
chipset manufacturers (e.g., Qualcomm), and browsers (e.g.,
Mozilla). We could not confidently identify the organizations
responsible for 9% of all the custom permissions.5
As shown in Table IV, 63% of all declared custom per-
missions are defined by 31 handset vendors according to our
classification. Most of them are associated with proprietary
services such as Mobile Device Management (MDM) solutions
for enterprise customers. Yet three vendors account for over
68% of the total custom permissions; namely Samsung (41%),
Huawei (20%), and Sony (formerly Sony-Ericsson, 7%). Most
of the custom permissions added by hardware vendors –
along with chipset manufacturers, and MNOs – are exposed
by Android core services, including the default browser
com.android.browser. Unfortunately, as demonstrated
in the MediaTek case [79], exposing such sensitive resources
in critical services may potentially increase the attack surface
if not implemented carefully.
An exhaustive analysis of custom permissions also suggests
(and in some cases confirms) the presence of service integra-
tion and commercial partnerships between handset vendors,
MNOs, analytics services (e.g., Baidu, ironSource, and Digital
Turbine), and online services (e.g., Skype, LinkedIn, Spotify,
CleanMaster, and Dropbox). We also found custom permis-
sions associated with vulnerable modules (e.g., MediaTek) and
potentially harmful services (e.g., Adups). We discuss cases of
interest below.
VPN solutions: Android provides native support to third-party
VPN clients. This feature is considered as highly sensitive
as it gives any app requesting access the capacity to break
Android’s sandboxing and monitor users’ traffic [68], [80].
The analysis of custom permissions reveals that Samsung and
Meizu implement their own VPN service. It is unclear why
these proprietary VPN implementations exist but it has been
reported as problematic by VPN developers for whom their
clients, designed for Android’s default VPN service, do not
run on such handsets [1], [86], [80]. A complete analysis of
these VPN packages is left for future work.
Facebook: We found 6 different Facebook packages, three
of them unavailable on Google Play, declaring 18 custom
permissions as shown in Table V. These permissions have
5While Android’s documentation recommends using reverse-domain-style
naming for defining custom permissions to avoid collisions. [26], 269 of them
– many of which are declared by a single hardware vendor – start with AOSP
prefixes such as android.permission.*. The absence of good development
practices among developers complicated this classification, forcing us to
follow a semi-manual process that involved analyzing multiple signals to
identify their possible purpose and for attribution.
been found in 24 Android vendors, including Samsung, Asus,
Xiaomi, HTC, Sony, and LG. According to users’ complaints,
two of these packages (com.facebook.appmanager and
com.facebook.system) seem to automatically down-
load other Facebook software such as Instagram in users’
phones [69], [70]. We also found interactions between Face-
book and MNOs such as Sprint.
Baidu: Baidu’s geo-location permission is exposed by pre-
installed apps, including core Android modules, in 7 different
vendors, mainly Chinese ones. This permission seems to be
associated with Baidu’s geocoding API [19] and could allow
app developers to circumvent Android’s location permission.
Digital Turbine: We have identified 8 custom permissions
in 8 vendors associated with Digital Turbine and its sub-
sidiary LogiaGroup. Their privacy policy indicates that they
collect personal data ranging from UIDs to traffic logs that
could be shared with their business partners, which are
undisclosed [27]. According to the SIM information of
these devices, Digital Turbine modules are mainly found
in North-American and Asian users. One package name,
com.dti.att (“dti” stands for Digital Turbine Ignite),
suggests the presence of a partnership with AT&T. A manual
analysis confirms that this is the case. By inspecting their
source-code, this package seems to implement comprehensive
software management service. Installations and removals of
apps by users are tracked and linked with PII, which only
seem to be “masked” (i.e., hashed) discretionally.
ironSource: The advertising company ironSource exposes
custom permissions related to its AURA Enterprise Solu-
tions [44]. We have identified several vendor-specific packages
exposing custom ironSource permissions, in devices made
by vendors such as Asus, Wiko, and HTC (the package
name and certificate signatures suggest that those modules are
possibly introduced with vendor’s collaboration). According
to ironSource’s material [45], AURA has access to over
800 million users per month, while gaining access to ad-
vanced analytics services and to pre-load software on cus-
tomers’ devices. A superficial analysis of some of these pack-
ages (e.g., com.ironsource.appcloud.oobe.htc,
com.ironsource.appcloud.oobe.asus) reveals that
they provide vendor-specific out-of-the-box-experience apps
(OOBE) to customize a given user’s device when the users
open their device for the first time and empower user engage-
ment [44], while also monitoring users’ activities.
Other Advertising and Tracking Services: Discussing every
custom permission introduced by third-party services indi-
vidually would require an analysis beyond the scope of this
paper. However, there are a couple of anecdotes of interest
that we discuss next. One is the case of a pre-installed app
signed by Vodafone (Greece) and present in a Samsung device
that exposes a custom permission associated with Exus [31],
a firm specialized in credit risk management and banking
solutions. Another service declaring custom permissions in
Samsung and LG handsets (likely sold by Verizon) is the
analytics and user engagement company Synchronoss. Its
privacy policy acknowledges the collection, processing and
sharing of personal data [65].
Call protection services: We identify three external com-
7Custom Providers
permissions Vendor Third-party MNO Chipset AV / Security Ind. Alliance Browser Other
Total 4,845 (108) 3,760 (37) 192 (34) 195 (15) 67 (63) 46 (13) 29 (44) 7 (6) 549 (75)
Android Modules
android 494 (21) 410 (9) — 12 (2) 4 (13) — 6 (7) — 62 (17)
com.android.systemui 90 (15) 67 (11) 1 (2) — — — — — 22 (8)
com.android.settings 87 (16) 63 (12) — 1 (1) — — — — 23 (8)
com.android.phone 84 (14) 56 (9) — 5 (2) 3 (5) — — — 20 (10)
com.android.mms 59 (11) 35 (10) — 1 (2) — — 1 (1) — 22 (8)
com.android.contacts 40 (7) 32 (3) — — — — — — 8 (5)
com.android.email 33 (10) 18 (4) — — — — — — 15 (17)
Table IV: Summary of custom permissions per provider category and their presence in selected sensitive Android core modules.
The value in brackets reports the number of Android vendors in which custom permissions were found.
Package Public # Vendors # Permissions
com.facebook.system No 18 2
com.facebook.appmanager No 15 4
com.facebook.katana (Facebook) Yes 14 8
com.facebook.orca (Messenger) Yes 5 5
com.facebook.lite (FB Lite) Yes 1 1
com.facebook.pages.app No 1 4
Total 3 24 18
Table V: Facebook packages on pre-installed handsets.
panies providing services for blocking undesired and spam
phone calls and text messages: Hiya [38], TrueCaller [57],
and PrivacyStar [59]. Hiya’s solution seems to be integrated
by T-Mobile (US), Orange (Spain), and AT&T (US) in their
subsidized Samsung and LG handsets according to the package
signatures. Hiya and TrueCaller’s privacy policies indicate that
they collect personal data from end users, including contacts
stored in the device, UIDs, and personal information [39]. 6
PrivacyStar’s privacy policy, instead, claims that any informa-
tion collected from a given user’s contacts is “NOT exported
outside the App for any purpose” [60].
B. Used Permissions
The use of permissions by pre-installed Android apps fol-
lows a power-law distribution: 4,736 of the package names
request at least one permission and 55 apps request more
that 100. The fact that pre-installed apps request many per-
missions to deliver their service does not necessarily imply
a breach of privacy for the user. However, we identified
a significant number of potentially over-privileged vendor-
and MNO-specific packages with suspicious activities such
as com.jrdcom.Elabel – a package signed by TCLMo-
bile requesting 145 permissions and labeled as malicious by
Hybrid Analysis (a free online malware analysis service) –
and com.cube26.coolstore (144 permissions). Like-
wise, the calculator app found on a Xiaomi Mi 4c requests
user’s location and the phone state, which gives it access to
UIDs such as the IMEI. We discuss more instances of over-
privileged apps in Section V-C.
Dangerous Android permissions. The median pre-installed
Android app requests three dangerous AOSP permissions.
When we look at the set of permissions requested by a given
6Note: the information rendered in their privacy policy differs when crawled
from a machine in the EU or the US. As of January 2019, none of these
companies mention the new European GDPR directive in their privacy
policies.
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Figure 2: Permissions defined by AV firms, MNOs, chipset
vendors and third parties, requested by pre-installed apps.
app (by its package name) across vendors, we can notice
significant differences. We investigate such variations in a
subset of 150 package names present at least in 20 different
vendors. This list contains mainly core Android services as
well as apps signed by independent companies (e.g., Adups)
and chipset manufacturers (e.g., Qualcomm).
Then, we group together all the permissions requested by
a given package name across all device models for each
brand. As in the case of exposed custom permissions, we
can see a tendency towards over-privileging these modules
in specific vendors. For instance, the number of permissions
requested by the core android module can range from
9 permissions in a Google-branded Android device to over
100 in most Samsung devices. Likewise, while the median
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Figure 3: Apps accessing vendors’ custom permissions.
com.android.contacts service requests 35 permissions,
this number goes over 100 for Samsung, Huawei, Advan, and
LG devices.
Custom permissions. 2,910 pre-installed apps request at least
one custom permission. The heatmap in Figure 2 shows
the number of custom permissions requested by pre-installed
packages in a hand-picked set of popular Android manufactur-
ers (x-axis). As we can see, the use of custom permissions also
varies across vendors, with those associated with large third-
party analytics and tracking services (e.g., Facebook), MNOs
(e.g., Vodafone), and AV/Security services (e.g., Hiya) being
the most requested ones.
This analysis uncovers possible partnerships beyond those
revealed in the previous sections. We identify vendor-
signed services accessing ironSource’s, Hiya’s, and Ac-
cuWeather’s permissions. This state of affairs potentially al-
lows third-party services and developers to gain access to
protected permissions requested by other pre-installed pack-
ages signed with the same signature. Further, we found
Sprint-signed packages resembling that of Facebook and Face-
book’s Messenger APKs (com.facebook.orca.vpl and
com.facebook.katana.vpl) requesting Flurry-related
permissions (a third-party tracking service owned by Verizon).
Commercial relationships between third-party services and
vendors appear to be bi-directional as shown in Figure 3. This
figure shows evidence of 87 apps accessing vendor permis-
sions, including packages signed by Facebook, ironSource,
Hiya, Digital Turbine, Amazon, Verizon, Spotify, various
browser, and MNOs – grouped by developer signature for
clarity purposes. As the heatmap indicates, Samsung, HTC and
Sony are the vendors enabling most of the custom permissions
requested by over-the-top apps. We found instances of apps
listed on the Play Store also requesting such permissions.
Unfortunately, custom permissions are not shown to users
when shopping for mobile apps in the store – therefore they
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Figure 4: System permissions requested by pre-installed apps
embedding TPLs.
are apparently requested without consent – allowing them to
cause serious damage to users’ privacy when misused by apps.
C. Permission Usage by TPLs
We look at the permissions used by apps embedding at least
one TPL. We study the access to permissions with a protection
level of either signature or signature|privileged
as they can only be granted to system apps [50] or those signed
with a system signature. The presence of TPLs in pre-installed
apps requesting access to a signature or dangerous permission
can, therefore, give it access to very sensitive resources without
user awareness and consent. Figure 4 shows the distribution of
signature permissions requested across apps embedding TPLs.
We find that the most used permissions – READ_LOGS –
allow the app (and thus the TPLs within it) to read system
logs, mount and unmount filesystems, or install packages.
We find no significant differences between the three types
of TPLs of interest. For completeness, we also find that 94
apps embedding TPLs of interest request custom permissions
as well. Interestingly, 53% of the 88 custom permissions used
by these apps are defined by Samsung.
D. Component Exposing
Custom permissions are not the only mechanism avail-
able for app developers to expose (or access) features and
components to (or from) other apps. Android apps can also
interact with each other using intents, a high-level communi-
cation abstraction [42]. An app may expose its component(s)
to external apps by declaring android:exported=true
in the manifest without protecting the component with any
additional measure, or by adding one or more intent-filters to
its declaration in the manifest; exposing it to a type of attack
known in the literature as a confused deputy attack [79]. If
the exported attribute is used, it can be protected by adding
a permission to the component, be it a custom permission or
an AOSP one, through checking the caller app’s permissions
programmatically in the component’s Java class.
We sought to identify potentially careless development
practices that may lead to components getting exposed without
any additional protection. Exporting components can lead to:
9i) harmful or malicious apps launching an exposed activity,
tricking users into believing that they are interacting with the
benign one; ii) initiating and binding to unprotected services;
and iii) malicious apps gaining access to sensitive data or the
ability to modify the app’s internal state.
We found 6,849 pre-installed apps that potentially expose
at least one activity in devices from 166 vendors and signed
by 261 developer signatures with exported=true. For
services, 4,591 apps (present in 157 vendors) signed by 183
developers including manufacturers, potentially exposed one
or more of their services to external apps. The top-10 vendors
in our dataset account for over 70% of the potentially exposed
activities and services.
Other relevant examples include an app that potentially ex-
poses several activities related to system configurations (device
administration, networking, etc.), hence allowing a malicious
developer could access or even tamper a users’ device settings.
The core package com.android.mms found in customized
firmware versions across several vendors also expose services
to read WAP messages to other apps. We also found 8 different
instances of a third-party app, found in handsets built by two
large Android manufacturers, whose intended purpose is to
provide remote technical support to customers. This particular
service provides remote administration to MNOs, including the
ability to record audio and video, browse files, access system
settings, and upload/download files. The key service to do so
is exposed and can be misused by other apps.
We leave the detailed study of apps vulnerable to confused
deputy attacks and the study of the access to these resources
by apps publicly available on Google Play for future work.
V. BEHAVIORAL ANALYSIS
We analyze the apps in our dataset to identify potentially
harmful and unwanted behaviors. To do this, we leverage
both static and dynamic analysis tools to elicit behavior and
characterize purpose and means. This section describes our
analysis pipeline and evidence of potentially harmful and
privacy-intrusive pre-installed packages.
A. Static Analysis
We triage all apps to determine the presence of potentially
harmful behaviors. This step allows us to obtain a high-level
overview of behaviors across the dataset and also provides us
with the basis to score apps and flag those potentially more
interesting. This step is critical since we could only afford to
manually inspect a limited subset of all available apps.
Toolkit. Our analysis pipeline integrates various static anal-
ysis tools to elicit behavior in Android apps, including
Androwarn [12], FlowDroid [74], and Amandroid [92], as
well as a number of custom scripts based on the Apktool [13]
and Androguard [4] frameworks. In this stage we do not use
dynamic analysis tools, which prevents us from identifying
hidden behaviors that rely on dynamic code uploading (DEX
loading) or reflection. This means that our results present a
lower-bound estimation of all the possible potentially harmful
behaviors. We search for apps using DEX loading and reflec-
tion to identify targets that deserve manual inspection.
Dataset. Because of scalability limitations – our dataset com-
prises 82,501 APK files with 6,496 unique package names –
we randomly select one APK file for each package name and
analyze the resulting set of apps, obtaining an analysis report
for 48% of them. The majority of the remaining packages
could not be analyzed due to the absence of a classes.dex
for odexed files. Even though in some cases we had the corre-
sponding .odex file, we generally could not deodex it since
the device’s Android framework file was needed to complete
this step but Firmware Scanner did not collect it. Moreover, we
could not analyze a small subset of apps due to the limitations
of our tools, including errors generated during analysis, file
size limitations, or analysis tools becoming unresponsive after
hours of processing. Instead, we focused our analysis on the
subset of apps for which we could generate reports.
Results. We processed the analysis reports and identified the
presence of the 36 potentially privacy intrusive behaviors or
potentially harmful behaviors listed in Table VI. The results
suggest that a significant fraction of the analyzed apps could
access and disseminate both user and device identifiers, user’s
location, and device current configuration. According to our
flow analysis, these results give the impression that personal
data collection and dissemination (regardless of the purpose
or consent) is not only pervasive but also comes pre-installed.
Other a priori concerning behaviors include the possible dis-
semination of contacts and SMS contents (164 and 74 apps,
respectively), sending SMS (29 apps), and making phone calls
(339 apps). Even though there are perfectly legitimate use
cases for these behaviors, they are also prevalent in harmful
and potentially unwanted software. The distribution of the
number of potentially harmful behaviors per app follows a
power-law distribution. Around 25% of the analyzed apps
present at least 5 of these behaviors, with almost 1% of
the apps showing 20 or more. The bulk of the distribution
relates to the collection of telephony and network identifiers,
interaction with the package manager, and logging activities.
This provides a glimpse of how pervasive user and device
fingerprinting is nowadays.
B. Traffic Analysis
While static analysis can be helpful to determine a lower
bound of what an app is capable of, relying on this technique
alone gives an incomplete picture of the real-world behavior
of an app. This might be due to code paths that are not
available at the time of analysis, including those that are
within statically- and dynamically-linked libraries that are not
provided with apps, behaviors determined by server-side logic
(e.g., due to real-time ad-bidding), or code that is loaded at
runtime using Java’s reflection APIs. This limitation of static
approaches is generally addressed by complementing static
analysis with dynamic analysis tools. However, due to various
limitations (including missing hardware features and software
components) it was unfeasible for us to run all the pre-
installed apps in our dataset in an analysis sandbox. Instead,
we decided to use the crowd-sourced Lumen mobile traffic
dataset to find evidence of dissemination of personal data from
the pre-installed apps by examining packages that exist in both
datasets.
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Accessed PII type / behaviors Apps (#) Apps (%)
Telephony
identifiers
IMEI 687 21.8
IMSI 379 12
Phone number 303 9.6
MCC 552 17.5
MNC 552 17.5
Operator name 315 10
SIM Serial number 181 5.7
SIM State 383 12.1
Current country 194 6.2
SIM country 196 6.2
Voicemail number 29 0.9
Device settings
Software version 25 0.8
Phone state 265 8.4
Installed apps 1,286 40.8
Phone type 375 11.9
Logs 2,568 81.4
Location
GPS 54 1.7
Cell location 158 5
CID 162 5.1
LAC 137 4.3
Network
interfaces
Wi-Fi configuration 9 0.3
Current network 1,373 43.5
Data plan 699 22.2
Connection state 71 2.3
Network type 345 10.9
Personal data Contacts 164 11SMS 73 2.31
Phone service
abuse
SMS sending 29 0.92
SMS interception 0 0
Disabling SMS notif. 0 0
Phone calls 339 10.7
Audio/video
interception
Audio recording 74 2.4
Video capture 21 0.7
Arbitrary code
execution
Native code 775 24.6
Linux commands 563 17.9
Remote conn. Remote connection 89 2.8
Table VI: Volume of apps accessing / reading PII or showing
potentially harmful behaviors. The percentage is referred to
the subset of triaged packages (N = 3, 154).
Results. Of the 3,118 pre-installed apps with Internet access
permissions, 1,055 have at least one flow in the Lumen dataset.
At this point, our analysis of these apps focused on two main
aspects: uncovering the ecosystem of organizations who own
the domains that these apps connect to, and analyzing the
types of private information they could disseminate from user
devices. To understand the ecosystem of data collection by
pre-installed apps, we studied where the data that is collected
by these apps makes its first stop. We use the Fully-Qualified
Domain Names (FQDN) of the servers that are contacted and
use the web crawling and text mining techniques described in
our previous work [85] to determine the parent organization
who own these domains.
The Big Players. Table VII shows the parent organizations
who own the most popular domains contacted by pre-installed
apps in the Lumen dataset. Of the 54,614 domains contacted
by apps, 7,629 belong to well-known Advertising and Track-
ing Services (ATS) [85]. These services are represented by
organizations like Alphabet, Facebook, Verizon (now owner
of Yahoo!, AOL, and Flurry), Twitter (MoPub’s parent or-
ganization), AppsFlyer, comScore, and others. As expected,
Organization # of apps # of domains
Alphabet 566 17052
Facebook 322 3325
Amazon 201 991
Verizon Communications 171 320
Twitter 137 101
Microsoft 136 408
Adobe 116 302
AppsFlyer 98 10
comScore 86 8
AccuWeather 86 15
MoatInc. 79 20
Appnexus 79 35
Baidu 72 69
Criteo 70 62
PerfectPrivacy 68 28
Other ATS 221 362
Table VII: Top 15 parent ATS organizations by number of
apps connecting to all their associated domains.
Alphabet, the entity that owns and maintains the Android plat-
form and many of the largest advertising and tracking services
(ATS) in the mobile ecosystem [85], also owns most of the
domains to which pre-installed apps connect to. Moreover,
vendors who ship their devices with the Google Play Store
have to go through Google’s certification program which, in
part, entails pre-loading Google’s services. Among these ser-
vices is Google’s own com.google.backuptransport
package, which sends a variety of information about the user
and the device on which it runs to Google’s servers.
Traffic analysis also confirms that Facebook and Twitter
services come pre-installed on many phones and are integrated
into various apps. Many devices also pre-install weather apps
like AccuWeather and The Weather Channel. As reported by
previous research efforts, these weather providers also gather
information about the devices and their users [87], [85].
C. Manual Analysis: Relevant Cases
We used the output provided by our static and dynamic
analysis pipeline to score apps and thus flag a reduced subset
of packages to inspect manually. Our goal here was to con-
fidently identify potentially harmful and unwanted behavior
in pre-installed apps. Other apps were added to this set
based on the results of our third-party library and permission
analysis performed in Sections III and IV, respectively. We
manually analyzed 158 apps using standard tools that include
DEX disassemblers (baksmali), dex-to-java decompilers (jadx,
dex2jar), resource analysis tools (Apktool), instrumentation
tools (Frida), and reverse engineering frameworks (radare2 and
IDA Pro) for native code analysis. Our main findings can be
loosely grouped into three large categories: 1) known malware;
2) potential personal data access and dissemination; and 3)
potentially harmful apps. Table VIII provides some examples
of the type of behaviors that we found.
Known Malware. We came across various isolated instances
of known-malware in the system partition, mostly in low-
end devices but also in some high-end phones. We identified
variants of well-known Android malware families that have
been prevalent in the last few years, including Triada, Rootnik,
SnowFox, Xinyin, Ztorg, Iop, and dubious software developed
by GMobi. We used VirusTotal to label these samples. Accord-
ing to existing AV reports, the range of behaviors that such
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Family Potential Behavior and Prevalence
Known Malware
Triada Disseminates PII and other sensitive data (SMS, call logs, contact data, stored pictures and videos). Downloads additional stages. Roots the
device to install additional apps.
Rootnik [62] Gains root access to the device. Leaks PII and installs additional apps. Uses anti-analysis and anti-debugging techniques.
GMobi [11], [67] Gmobi Trade Service. Leaks PII, including device serial number and MAC address, geolocation, installed packages and emails. Receives
commands from servers to (1) send an SMS to a given number; (2) download and install apps; (3) visit a link; or (4) display a pop-up. It
has been identified in low-end devices.
Potentially Dangerous Apps
Rooting app Exposes an unprotected receiver that roots the device upon receiving a telephony secret code (via intent or dialing *#*#9527#*#*).
Blocker If the device does not contain a signed file in a particular location, it loads and enforces 2 blacklists: one containing 103 packages associated
with benchmarking apps, and another with 56 web domains related to phone reviews.
Potential Personal Data Access and Dissemination
TrueCaller Sends PII to its own servers and embedded third-party ATSes such as AppsFlyer, Twitter-owned MoPub, Crashlytics, inMobi, Facebook,
and others. Uploads phone call data to at least one of its own domains.
MetroName ID Disseminates PII to its own servers and also to third-party services like Piano, a media audience and engagement analytics service that
tracks user’s installation of news apps and other partners including those made by CNBC, Bloomberg, TechCrunch, and The Economist,
among others, the presence of which it reports to its own domains.
Adups [47] FOTA app. Collects and shares private and PII with their own servers and those of embedded third-party ATS domains, including Advmob
and Nexage. Found worldwide in 55 brands.
Stats/Meteor Redstone’s FOTA service. Uses dynamic code uploading and reflection to deploy components located in 2 encrypted DEX files. Disseminates
around 50 data items that fully characterize the hardware, the telephony service, the network, geolocation, and installed packages. Performs
behavioral and performance profiling, including counts of SMS/MMS, calls logs, bytes sent and transmitted, and usage stats and performance
counters on a package-basis. Silently installs packages on the device and reports what packages are installed / removed by the user.
Table VIII: Examples of relevant cases and their potential behaviors found after manual analysis of a subset of apps. When
referring to personal data dissemination, the term PII encompasses items enumerated in Table VI.
samples exhibit encompass banking fraud, sending SMS to
premium numbers or subscribing to services, silently installing
additional apps, visiting links, and showing ads, among others.
While our method does not allow us to distinguish whether
potentially malicious apps are indeed pre-installed or took
advantage of system vulnerabilities to install themselves in
the system partition, it is important to highlight that the
presence of pre-installed malware in Android devices has been
previously reported by various sources [66], [6], [67]. Some
of the found samples use Command and Control (C2) servers
still in operation at the time of this writing.
Personal Data Access and Potential Dissemination. Nearly
all apps which we identified as able to access PII, appear
to disseminate it to third-party servers. We also observed
instances of apps with capabilities to perform hardware and
network fingerprinting, often collected under the term “de-
vice capability,” and even analytics services that track the
installation and removal of apps (notably news apps, such
as those made by CNBC, Bloomberg, TechCrunch, and The
Economist, among others). More intrusive behaviors include
apps able to collect and send email and phone call metadata.
The most extreme case we analyzed is a data collection
service contained in a FOTA service associated with Redstone
Sunshine Technology Co., Ltd. [61], an OTA provider that
“supports 550 million phone users and IoT partners in 40
countries” [22]. This app includes a service that can collect
and disseminate dozens of data items, including both user and
device identifiers, behavioral information (counts of SMS and
calls sent and received, and statistics about network flows)
and usage statistics and performance information per installed
package. Overall, this software seems to implement an analyt-
ics program that admits several monetization strategies, from
optimized ad targeting to providing performance feedback to
both developers and manufacturers. We emphasize that the
data collected is not only remarkably extensive and multi-
dimensional, but also very far away from being anonymous
as it is linked to both user and device IDs.
Potentially dangerous apps. We found 612 pre-installed
apps that potentially implement engineering- or factory-mode
functions according to their package and app names. Such
functions include relatively harmless tasks, such as hardware
tests, but also potentially dangerous functions such as the
ability to root the device. We found instances of such apps in
which the rooting function was unprotected in their manifest
(i.e., the component was available for every other app to
use). We also identified well-known vulnerable engineering
mode apps such like MTKLogger [82]. Such apps expose
unprotected components that can be misused by other apps
co-located in the device. Other examples include a well
known manufacturer’s service, which under certain conditions
blacklists connections to a pre-defined list of 56 web domains
(mobile device review and benchmarking websites, mostly)
and disables any installed package that matches one of a list
of 103 benchmarking apps.
VI. STUDY LIMITATIONS
Completeness and coverage. Our dataset is not complete
in terms of Android vendors and models, even though we
cover those with a larger market share, both in the high- and
low-end parts of the spectrum. Our data collection process
is also best-effort. The lack of background knowledge and
documentation required performing a detailed case-by-case
study and a significant amount of manual inspection. In terms
of analyzed apps, determining the coverage of our study is
difficult since we do not know the total number of pre-installed
apps in all shipped handsets.
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Attribution. There is currently no reliable way to accurately
find the legitimate developer of a given pre-installed app by its
self-signed signature. We have found instances of certificates
with just a country code in the Issuer field, and others
with strings suggesting major vendors (e.g., Google) signed
the app, where the apps certainly were not signed by them.
The same applies to package and permission names, many
of which are opaque and not named following best-practices.
Likewise, the lack of documentation regarding custom permis-
sions prevented us from automatizing our analysis. Moreover,
a deeper study of this issue would require checking whether
those permissions are granted in runtime, tracing the code
to fully identify their purpose, and finding whether they are
actually used by other apps in the wild, and at scale.
Package Manager. We do not collect the packages.xml
file from our users’ devices as it contains information about
all installed packages, and not just pre-installed ones. We
consider that collecting this file would be invasive. This,
however, limits our ability to see if user-installed apps are
using services exposed by pre-installed apps via intents or
custom permissions. We tried to compensate for that with a
manual search for public apps that use pre-installed custom
permissions, as discussed in Section IV-D.
Behavioral coverage. Our study mainly relies on static anal-
ysis of the samples harvested through Firmware Scanner, and
we only applied dynamic analysis to a selected subset of 1,055
packages. This prevents us from eliciting behaviors that are
only available at runtime because of the use of code loading
and reflection, and also code downloading from third-party
servers. Despite this, our analysis pipeline served to identify
a considerable amount of potentially harmful behaviors. A
deeper and broader analysis would possibly uncover more
cases.
Identifying rooted devices. There is no sure way of knowing
whether a device is rooted or not. While our conservative
approach limits the number of false negatives, we have found
occurrences of devices with well-known custom ROMs that
were not flagged as rooted by RootBeer. Moreover, we have
found some apps that allow a third party to root the device on-
the-fly to, for example, install new apps on the system partition
as discussed in Section V-C. Some of these apps can then un-
root the phone to avoid detection. Under the presence of such
an app on a device, we cannot know for sure if a given package
– particularly a potentially malicious app – was pre-installed
by an actor in the supply chain, or was installed afterwards.
VII. RELATED WORK
Android images customization. Previous work has been
focused on studying modifications made to AOSP images,
whether by adding root certificates [89], customizing the
default apps [73], or the OS itself [95]. In [72], Aafer et
al. introduced a new class of vulnerability caused by the
firmware customization process. If an app is removed but
a reference to it remains in the OS, a malicious app could
potentially impersonate it which could lead to privacy and
security issues. While these studies have focused on Android
images as a whole rather than pre-installed apps, they all show
the complexity of the Android ecosystem and underline the
lack of control over the supply chain.
Android permissions. Previous studies on Android permis-
sions have mainly leveraged static analysis techniques to infer
the role of a given permission [75], [78]. These studies, how-
ever, do not cover newer versions of Android [94], or custom
permissions. In [81], Jiang et al. demonstrated how custom
permissions are used to expose and protect services. Our work
complements this study by showing how device makers and
third parties alike declare and use custom permissions, and
make the first step towards a complete and in-depth analysis
of the whole custom permissions’ landscape.
Vulnerabilities in pre-installed apps. A recent paper by
Wu et al. [93] also used crowdsourcing mechanisms to detect
apps that listen to a given TCP or UDP port and analyze the
vulnerabilities that are caused by this practice. While their
study is not limited to user-installed apps, they show evidence
of pre-installed apps exhibiting this behavior.
VIII. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
This paper studied, at scale, the vast and unexplored ecosys-
tem of pre-installed Android software and its potential impact
on consumers. This study has made clear that, thanks in large
part to the open-source nature of the Android platform and the
complexity of its supply chain, organizations of various kinds
and sizes have the ability to embed their software in custom
Android firmware versions. As we demonstrated in this paper,
this situation has become a peril to users’ privacy and even
security due to an abuse of privilege or as a result of poor
software engineering practices that introduce vulnerabilities
and dangerous backdoors.
The Supply Chain. The myriad of actors involved in the
development of pre-installed software and the supply chain
range from hardware manufacturers to MNOs and third-party
advertising and tracking services. These actors have privileged
access to system resources through their presence in pre-
installed apps but also as third-party libraries embedded in
them. Potential partnerships and deals – made behind closed
doors between stakeholders – may have made user data a
commodity before users purchase their devices or decide to
install software of their own.
Attribution. Unfortunately, due to a lack of central authority
or trust system to allow verification and attribution of the self-
signed certificates that are used to sign apps, and due to a lack
of any mechanism to identify the purpose and legitimacy of
many of these apps and custom permissions, it is difficult to
attribute unwanted and harmful app behaviors to the party or
parties responsible. This has broader negative implications for
accountability and liability in this ecosystem as a whole.
The Role of Users and Informed Consent. In the meantime
regular Android users are, by and large, unaware of the
presence of most of the software that comes pre-installed on
their Android devices and their associated privacy risks. Users
are clueless about the various data-sharing relationships and
partnerships that exist between companies that have a hand in
deciding what comes pre-installed on their phones. Users’ ac-
tivities, personal data, and habits may be constantly monitored
by stakeholders that many users may have never heard of, let
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alone consented to collect their data. We have demonstrated
instances of devices being backdoored by companies with
the ability to root and remotely control devices without user
awareness, and install apps through targeted monetization and
user-acquisition campaigns. Even if users decide to stop or
delete some of these apps, they will not be able to do so since
many of them are core Android services and others cannot be
permanently removed by the user without root privileges. It is
unclear if the users have actually consented to these practices,
or if they were informed about them before using the devices
(i.e., on first boot) in the first place. To clarify this, we acquired
6 popular brand-new Android devices from vendors including
Nokia, Sony, LG, and Huawei from a large Spanish retailer.
When booting them, 3 devices did not present a privacy policy
at all, only the Android terms of service. The rest rendered
a privacy policy that only mentions that they collect data
about the user, including PII such as the IMEI for added
value services. Note that users have no choice but to accept
Android’s terms of service, as well as the manufacturer’s one
if presented to the user. Otherwise Android will simply stop
booting, which will effectively make the device unusable.
Consumer Protection Regulations. While some jurisdictions
have very few regulations governing online tracking and data
collection, there have been a number of movements to regulate
and control these practices, such as the GDPR in the EU [29],
and California’s CCPA [21] in the US. While these efforts
are certainly helpful in regulating the rampant invasion of
users’ privacy in the mobile world, they have a long way
to go. Most mobile devices still lack a clear and meaningful
mechanism to obtain informed consent, which is a potential
violation of the GDPR. In fact, it is possible that many of the
ATSes that come pre-installed on Android devices may not be
COPPA-compliant [88] – a US federal rule to protect minors
from unlawful online tracking [23] –, despite the fact that
many minors in the US use mobile devices with pre-installed
software that engage in data collection. This indicates that even
in jurisdictions with strict privacy and consumer protection
laws, there still remains a large gap between what is done
in practice and the enforcement capabilities of the agencies
appointed to uphold the law.
Recommendations. To address the issues mentioned above
and to make the ecosystem more transparent we propose
a number of recommendations which are made under the
assumption that stakeholders are willing to self-regulate and
to enhance the status quo. We are aware that some of these
suggestions may inevitably not align with corporate interests
of every organizations in the supply chain, and that an inde-
pendent third party may be needed to audit the process. Google
might be a prime candidate for it given its capacity for licens-
ing vendors and its certification programs. Alternatively, in
absence of self-regulation, governments and regulatory bodies
could step in and enact regulations and execute enforcement
actions that wrest back some of the control from the various
actors in the supply chain. We also propose a number of
actions that would help independent investigators to detect
deceptive and potentially harmful behaviors.
• Attribution and accountability: To combat the difficulty in
attribution and the resulting lack of accountability, we propose
the introduction and use of certificates that are signed by
globally-trusted certificate authorities. Alternatively, it may be
possible to build a certificate transparency repository dedicated
to providing details and attribution for self-signed certificates
used to sign various Android apps, including pre-installed
ones.
• Accessible documentation and consent forms: Similar to
the manner in which open-source components of Android
require any modified version of the code to be made publicly-
available, Android devices can be required to document the
specific set of apps that have pre-installed, along with their
purpose and the entity responsible for each piece of software,
in a manner that is accessible and understandable to the users.
This will ensure that at least a reference point exists for
users (and regulators) to find accurate information about pre-
installed apps and their practices. Moreover, the results of our
small-scale survey of consent forms of some Android vendors
leaves a lot to be desired from a transparency perspective:
users are not clearly informed about third-party software that
is installed on their devices, including embedded third-party
tracking and advertising services, the types of data they collect
from them by default, and the partnerships that allow personal
data to be shared over the Internet. This necessitates a new
form of privacy policy suitable for pre-installed apps to be
defined (and enforced) to ensure that such practices are at
least communicated to the user in a clear and accessible way.
This should be accompanied by mechanisms to enable users
to make informed decisions about how or whether to use such
devices without having to root them.
Final Remarks. Despite a full year of efforts, we were only
able to scratch the surface of a much larger problem. This
work is therefore exploratory, and we hope it will bring more
attention to the Android supply chain ecosystem and its impact
on users’ privacy and security. We have discussed our results
with Google which gave us useful feedback. Our work was
also the basis of a report produced by the Spanish Data
Protection Agency (AEPD) [3]. We will also improve the
capabilities and features of both Firmware Scanner and Lumen
to address some of the aforementioned limitations and develop
methods to perform dynamic analysis of pre-installed software.
Given the scale of the ecosystem and the need for manual
inspections, we will gradually make our dataset (which keeps
growing at the time of this writing) available to the research
community and regulators to aid in future investigations and
to encourage more research in this area.
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APPENDIX
A. Userbase distribution
Table IX describes our userbase geographical distribution.
Country
(N=130)
Samples
Vendors Vendor’s
shareTotal Unique
USA 12% 36 11 17%
Spain 6% 24 3 11%
Indonesia 6% 26 7 12%
Italy 5% 15 6 7%
UK 4% 19 6 9%
Mexico 3% 17 3 8%
Thailand 3% 28 12 13%
Germany 3% 21 2 10%
Belgium 2% 17 4 8%
Netherlands 2% 16 2 8%
Total countries 130 — 214
Table IX: Geographical distribution of our users. Only the top
10 countries are shown.
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B. Custom permissions
Table X reports a subset of custom permissions defined by device vendors, MNOs, third-party services, and chipset
manufacturers.
MANUFACTURER PERMISSIONS
Package name Developer Signature Vendor(s) Permission
com.sonyericsson.facebook.proxylogin Sony Ericsson (SE) Sony com.sonyericsson.permission.FACEBOOK
com.sonymobile.twitter.account Sony Ericsson (SE) Sony com.sonymobile.permission.TWITTER
android Sony Ericsson (SE) Sony com.sonymobile.googleanalyticsproxy.permission.GOOGLE ANALYTICS
com.htc.socialnetwork.facebook Android (TW) HTC *.permission.SYSTEM USE
com.sonymobile.gmailreaderservice Sony Ericsson (SE) Sony com.sonymobile.permission.READ GMAIL
com.sec.android.daemonapp Samsung Corporation (KR) Samsung *.ap.accuweather.ACCUWEATHER DAEMON ACCESS PROVIDER
android Lenovo (CN) Lenovo android.permission.LENOVO MDM
com.asus.loguploaderproxy AsusTek (TW) Asus asus.permission.MOVELOGS
com.miui.core Xiaomi (CN) Xiaomi miui.permission.DUMP CACHED LOG
android Samsung (KR) Samsung com.sec.enterprise.knox.KNOX GENERIC VPN
com.sec.enterprise.permissions Samsung (KR) Samsung android.permission.sec.MDM ENTERPRISE VPN SOLUTION
com.android.vpndialogs Meizu (CN) Meizu com.meizu.permission.CONTROL VPN
MNO PERMISSIONS
Package name Developer Signature MNO Permission
com.android.mms ZTE T-Mobile US com.tmobile.comm.RECEIVE METRICS
com.lge.ipservice LG T-Mobile US com.tmobile.comm.RECEIVE METRICS
hr.infinum.mojvip Infinum (HR) [41] H1 Croatia hr.infinum.mojvip.permission.RECEIVE ADM MESSAGE
com.locationlabs.cni.att AT&T (US) AT&T (US) [48] com.locationlabs.cni.att.permission.BROADCAST
com.asurion.android.verizon.vms Asurion (US) [18] Verizon (US) com.asurion.android.verizon.vms.permission.C2D MESSAGE
jp.naver.line.android Naver (JP) South Korea Telekom com.skt.aom.permission.AOM RECEIVE
THIRD-PARTY SERVICE PERMISSIONS
Package name Developer Signature Provider Permission
com.facebook.system Facebook Facebook *.ACCESS
com.amazon.kindle Amazon Amazon com.amazon.identity.auth.device.perm.AUTH SDK
com.huawei.android.totemweather Huawei (CN) Baidu android.permission.BAIDU LOCATION SERVICE
com.oppo.findmyphone Oppo (CN) Baidu android.permission.BAIDU LOCATION SERVICE
com.dti.sliide Logia Digital Turbine com.digitalturbine.ignite.ACCESS LOG
com.dti.att Logia Digital Turbine com.dti.att.permission.APP EVENTS
com.ironsource.appcloud.oobe.wiko ironSource ironSource com.ironsource.aura.permission.C2D MESSAGE
com.vcast.mediamanager Verizon (US) Synchronoss com.synchronoss.android.sync.provider.FULL PERMISSION
com.myvodafone.android Vodafone (GR) Exus uk.co.exus.permission.C2D MESSAGE
com.trendmicro.freetmms.gmobi TrendMicro (TW) GMobi com.trendmicro.androidmup.ACCESS TMMSMU REMOTE SERVICE
com.skype.rover Skype (GB) Skype com.skype.android.permission.READ CONTACTS
com.cleanmaster.sdk Samsung (KR) CleanMaster com.cleanmaster.permission.sdk.clean
com.netflix.partner.activation Netflix (US) Netflix *.permission.CHANNEL ID
CHIPSET PERMISSIONS
Package name Developer Signature Provider Permission
com.qualcomm.location ZTE (CN) Qualcomm com.qualcomm.permission.IZAT
com.mediatek.mtklogger TCL (CN) MediaTek com.permission.MTKLOGGER
com.android.bluetooth Samsung (KR) Broadcom broadcom.permission.BLUETOOTH MAP
Table X: Custom permission examples. The wildcard * represents the package name whenever the permission prefix and the
package name overlap.
